




UNCHARTED WATERS:  FINANCIAL CRISIS AND 
ENFORCEMENT OF ICSID AWARDS IN ARGENTINA 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The creation of the International Centre for Settlement of In-
vestment Disputes (ICSID)1 conceived a system of dispute resolu-
tion in 1966 that would allow judicial settlements between foreign 
investors and state governments for disputes that previously 
lacked a forum for resolution.2  ICSID originated under the Con-
vention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States 
and Nationals of other States (the Convention) and was designed 
 
* J.D. Candidate, 2007, University of Pennsylvania Law School; M.Sc. Latin 
American Studies, 2004, University of Oxford; A.B. Politics, 2000, Princeton Uni-
versity.  Many thanks to Professor William Burke-White and Danny Allen for 
their invaluable input and comments during this process, and to the editors of the 
Journal of International Economic Law for their tremendous effort in preparing 
this article for publication. 
1 Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and 
Nationals of Other States, opened for signature Mar. 18, 1965, 17 U.S.T. 1270, 575 
U.N.T.S. 159 (entered into force Oct. 14, 1996), available at http:// 
www.worldbank.org/icsid/basicdoc/basicdoc.htm [hereinafter ICSID Conven-
tion]. 
2 Prior to ICSID’s creation, the international community worried that existing 
international arrangements for dealing with disputes between developing coun-
tries and foreign investors were inadequate.  Historically, settling such claims was 
difficult, in large part because investors had little ability to control court access.  
Although the investor could resort to either local remedies or home state courts, 
the ability to do so was dependent on the local government’s willingness to sub-
mit to a court’s jurisdiction. See James C. Baker & Lois J. Yoder, ICSID and the 
Calvo Clause a Hindrance to Foreign Direct Investment in LDCs, 5 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. 
RESOL. 75, 75 (1989) (discussing this background). 
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to promote increased flows of international investment.3  By creat-
ing facilities for the arbitration of investment disputes between 
Contracting States and nationals of other Contracting States, the 
Convention aimed to promote mutual confidence between States 
and investors and increase the flow of investment, particularly into 
less-developed countries (LDCs).4  Moreover, because the Presi-
dent of the World Bank traditionally had assisted in mediation of 
investment disputes between governments and private foreign in-
vestors, the formation of ICSID was also intended to relieve the 
President and the staff of the burden of involvement in such dis-
putes.5 
Executed in Washington, D.C., the ICSID Convention (also 
known as the Washington Convention) was sponsored by the In-
ternational Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD or 
more commonly known as the World Bank).  Aron Broches, then 
the General Counsel for the World Bank, conceived of the Conven-
tion after efforts by the Organization for European Economic Co-
operation (now known as the OECD) to create a similar framework 
failed.6  By consulting legal experts in Africa, the Americas, Asia, 
and Europe regarding a preliminary draft of an international con-
vention, Broches and his staff prepared an official draft to the Ex-
ecutive Directors of the World Bank.  In March 1965, this text was 
approved as the text of the ICSID Convention.  The mandatory 
minimum of twenty States quickly ratified the Convention, and the 
Convention was entered into force on October 14, 1966.7 
In the early years of the Convention, a relatively small number 
of cases were tried under the auspices of ICSID.  Few materials in-
terpreted the Convention, and copies of arbitral awards were diffi-
cult to find.8  However, in recent years, as more States have ratified 
 
3 Mary L. Moreland, “Foreign Control” and “Agreement” under ICSID Article 
25(2)(B): Standards for Claims Brought by Locally Organized Subsidiaries Against Host 
States, 9 CURRENTS INT’L TRADE L.J. 18, 18 (2000). 
4 Baker & Yoder, supra note 2, at 75. 
5  About ICSID, THE WORLD BANK GROUP, http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/ 
about/about.htm (last visited March 29, 2007). See also K.V.S.K. NATHAN, THE 
ICSID CONVENTION: THE LAW OF THE INTERNATIONAL CENTRE FOR SETTLEMENT OF 
INVESTMENT DISPUTES 49 (2000) (generally discussing the history of the ICSID 
Convention, including the World Bank President’s role as an international arbitra-
tor). 
6 LUCY REED ET AL., GUIDE TO ICSID ARBITRATION 1 (2004) (outlining a brief 
history of the ICSID Convention). 
7 Id. at 2. 
8 Moreland, supra note 3, at 18. 
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the ICSID Convention, the number of disputes heard under the 
Convention has risen dramatically.  Ninety-nine countries had 
signed the Convention as of 1990.  By December 15, 2006, 155 
States had signed the Convention and 143 States had ratified it.9  In 
fact, roughly as many cases are presently pending before the tribu-
nal as have been decided since creation of the Convention.10 
Argentina was among the most recent wave of signatories to 
the Convention, signing the treaty in May of 1991 and depositing 
its instrument of ratification in October 1994.11  Ratifying the Con-
vention represents a marked departure from prior economic in-
vestment policy for many Latin American countries.  In fact, for 
much of the twentieth century, Argentina required investors to 
submit contractual disputes of foreign investors to local courts for 
remedy.12  In order to facilitate the introduction of capital into its 
markets, Argentina abandoned this policy by signing the ICSID 
Convention and entering into a number of bilateral agreements 
with the United States and thirty-seven other countries, all of 
which allow the use of international arbitration without first resort-
ing to domestic courts.13 
The consent to ICSID arbitration has since opened Argentina 
up to a potentially untenable volume of arbitration suits.  The eco-
nomic upheaval that Argentina experienced in 2001 and 2002 left 
private investors with numerous claims for breach of contract 
against the State for its actions during the crisis.  In 2004, thirty-five 
ICSID cases were pending against Argentina, most of which were 
based on measures the government introduced to address the eco-
 
9 List of Contracting States and other Signatories of the Convention, THE WORLD 
BANK GROUP, http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/constate/c-states-en.htm (last 
visited Mar. 29, 2007) [hereinafter List of Contracting States]. 
10 One hundred ten cases were pending before the ICSID tribunals as of April 
2007, whereas one hundred twenty-one had been concluded by the same date.  See  
ICSID Cases, THE WORLD BANK GROUP, http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/ 
cases/cases.htm (last visited Mar. 29, 2007) (listing the cases currently before 
ICSID). 
11 List of Contracting States, supra note 9. 
12 See infra Section 4 (discussing the Calvo Doctrine). 
13 Treaty Between the United States of America and the Argentine Republic 
Concerning the Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of Investment, U.S.-
Arg., Nov. 14, 1991, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 103-2 (1993).  See also Bilateral Investment 
Treaties, THE WORLD BANK GROUP, http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/treaties/ 
argentina.htm (last visited Mar. 29, 2007) (detailing Argentina’s bilateral invest-
ment treaties). 
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nomic crisis in 2001.14  Indeed, many were brought by foreign-
owned utilities with local concessions and stem from Argentina’s 
decision in 2002 to convert utility rates into devalued pesos and 
freeze them.15  Although the devaluation operated across the board 
and affected all creditors, companies such as BP, France Telecom, 
Siemens, and Suez have pursued claims against Argentina for 
breach of contract and international treaty law, particularly the bi-
lateral investment treaties (BITs) signed between Argentina and 
other individual nations.16 
In May 2005, an ICSID tribunal ruled in favor of a U.S. com-
pany, CMS Gas Transmission Company,17 in a suit against Argen-
tina for violations of contractual undertakings and the U.S.–
Argentina BIT.  Argentina was ordered to pay CMS over $130 mil-
lion to compensate for losses incurred as a result of the crisis.18  By 
February 2007, there were thirty-four cases pending against Argen-
tina under ICSID for the loss of income and change to existing con-
tracts following the financial crash.19  ICSID arbitration is not an 
inexpensive process for Argentina to undergo, however.  Hiring 
the three arbitrators necessary to arbitrate each case costs the gov-
ernment on average an estimated $500,000.20  Moreover, because 
the Argentine government defaulted on $80 billion of its debt in 
2001, bondholder claims worldwide are worth more than $100 bil-
lion after unpaid interest is included.21 
 
14 See James L. Loftis & Adrianne L. Goins, International Law, in 2005 Year in 
Review,  69 TEX. B.J. 45, 46 (2006) (giving these figures as an illustration of the rise 
in international arbitration taking place).  By February 2007, only one of these 
cases seems to have been fully settled against Argentina according to the ICSID 
website.  Cases, THE WORLD BANK GROUP, http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/ 
cases/pending.htm (last visited Mar. 29, 2007). 
15 Argentina Treasury Attorney: World Bank Claims Could Reach $80 Billion (Dow 
Jones Newswires Jan. 21, 2005) [hereinafter World Bank Claims]. 
16 Luke Eric Peterson, Legal Tango, FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT, Aug. 1, 2005, 
http://www.fdimagazine.com/news/fullstory.php/aid/1336/ 
Legal_tango.html. 
17 CMS Gas Transmission Co. v. Argentine Republic, ARB/01/8 (ICSID 
2005). 
18 Id. 
19 Cases, supra note 14. 
20 LUKE ERIC PETERSON, BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES AND DEVELOPMENT 
POLICY-MAKING 24–25 (2004), available at http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2004/ 
trade_bits.pdf (last visited Mar. 29, 2007). 
21 German Investor Dogs Argentines on Debt (Dow Jones Newswires Jan. 21, 
2005).  Although some of this debt has since been restructured, the potential pay-
out for Argentina is significant. 
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Although the enforcement of ICSID awards has been neither 
problematic nor questioned,22 Argentina’s current situation poses a 
real problem for enforcement in the future.  To start, Argentine of-
ficials have publicly recognized the country’s inability to pay out 
all of the potential claims.23  This inability to pay has called the 
credibility of the system as a whole into question.  For politicians 
from Argentina and similarly situated countries, a system that 
cannot cope with the realities of economic crisis cannot be sus-
tained.  Indeed, current Attorney for the Treasury, Osvaldo Gug-
lielmino, criticized ICSID as being more extraordinarily unfavor-
able than justice systems in any other country in the world.24  
Argentina’s former Minister of Justice, Horacio Rosatti, has simi-
larly criticized the system, prominently arguing for its reform in 
such a way that would exclude from attachment assets used for 
public services from its jurisdiction.25  As Rosatti claimed in an in-
terview, “‘the public service policy of a country cannot be decided 
by a litigation at [ICSID].’”26  Under what has since been called the 
Rosatti Doctrine, the decision of a tribunal cannot have higher legal 
significance than the domestic Argentine Constitution.  Under this 
doctrine, enforcement of ICSID awards, heretofore thought to be 
automatic and inescapable, may not be assured against Argentina.  
Judging from official rhetoric, any awards against Argentina that 
 
22 According to Anoosha Boralessa, the issues of enforcement rarely occur 
because most ICSID cases settle before an award is rendered and statues operate 
in a state of auto-regulation.  Sovereign parties are pressured by the desire to 
maintain a good reputation, within business communities or to the public at large, 
to comply with the award, regardless of its size.  See Anoosha Boralessa, Enforce-
ment in the United States and United Kingdom of ICSID Awards Against the Republic of 
Argentina: Obstacles that Transnational Corporations May Face, 17 N.Y. INT’L L. REV. 
53, 55 (2004) (outlining this argument).  Moreover, the Debtor State has the incen-
tive to comply with awards because the investor is given a revival of the right to 
diplomatic protection by the investor’s state of nationality under Article 27.  Id. at 
66. 
23 World Bank Claims, supra note 15. 
24 Id. 
25 Julio Burdman, La protección a las inversiones extranjeras en Argentina (1989-
2005): Una mirada político-económica, in POLÍTICAS LIBERALES EXITOSAS: SOLUCIONES 
PENSANDO EN LA GENTE 139, 149 (Gustavo Lazzari & Martín Simonetta eds., 2005), 
available at http://admin.fnst.org/uploads/1198/Politicas_liberales_exitosas.pdf 
(last visited Mar. 29, 2007). 
26 Roberto Bissio, Argentina, THE THIRD WORLD INSTITUTE, March 31, 2005, 
http://www.item.org.uy/eng/texto_completo.php?id=2716. 
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are contrary to what the country deems a domestic constitutional 
legal right may be rejected.27 
It is important to note here, however, that the ICSID Conven-
tion provides for automatic enforcement of its awards in the juris-
dictions of other Convention signatories.28  Claimants can enforce 
the awards against Argentine assets abroad without Argentina’s 
interference or consent.  Thus, while Argentina may make this ar-
gument regarding domestic enforcement, there may be enough 
Argentine assets in Contracting States to settle many of the awards 
regardless of Argentina’s domestic rejection of the ICSID award. 
However, the actual ability of Argentina to satisfy claims and the 
advisability of doing so for its national economic well-being are 
two separate questions. 
This comment will thus examine how the ICSID arbitration sys-
tem deals with matters of large economic upheaval, particularly as 
it pertains to Argentina.  It will first deconstruct the pertinent his-
tory and requirements of the dispute settlement system.  In recog-
nition of the importance of Argentina’s prior policy regarding in-
ternational disputes, this comment will also give brief overviews of 
both the Calvo Clause and Bilateral Investment Treaties as they 
concern Argentina.  Finally, the comment will examine in more de-
tail Argentina’s current position regarding arbitration awards and 
the implications of this position for ICSID as a whole. 
2. BEHIND THE ICSID CONVENTION 
ICSID was created as a result of the international community’s 
concern with the inadequacy of measures to deal with disputes be-
tween developing countries and foreign investors, with the view 
that the dearth of such procedures impeded the flow of develop-
ment into those countries.29  Private foreign investors have histori-
cally struggled to effectively bring claims against developing coun-
 
27 Id. 
28 See ICSID Convention, supra note 1, art. 54(1), which states: 
Each Contracting State shall recognize an award rendered pursuant to 
this Convention as binding and enforce the pecuniary obligations im-
posed by that award within its territories as if it were a final judgment of 
a court in that State. A Contracting State with a federal constitution may 
enforce such an award in or through its federal courts and may provide 
that such courts shall treat the award as if it were a final judgment of the 
courts of a constituent state. 
29 Baker & Yoder, supra note 2 at 76–77. 
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tries.  Among the myriad problems facing the investors was the in-
ability of the investor to control court access.  The basic interna-
tional legal rule is that individuals have no access to international 
courts.  While an investor could resort to local remedies, the avail-
ability was determined by the host government.  The individual, 
even if able to secure settlement in local courts, would likely be 
subject to domestic prejudice.  If the investor were to seek protec-
tion from his own government, resolution of the dispute would 
still require the host government to submit to a court’s jurisdic-
tion.30  With the traditional ideas of sovereign immunity, it was ex-
tremely difficult to induce a state to agree to restrict its own power 
vis-à-vis a foreign private investor.  Private investors lacked juris-
dictional standing to proceed against foreign governments in in-
ternational forums.31  Any chance of gaining jurisdiction required 
that their home government sponsor the cause of the investors be-
fore they could proceed against the offending country.  Not only 
did this make the protection of the investors’ rights more difficult, 
but it also turned private investment disputes into political issues.32 
The idea of an international forum for disputes between private 
investors and States was presented by the Secretary-General of the 
United Nations (U.N.) in 1960, but was unable to gain traction.33  In 
1961, Broches, then the General Counsel of the World Bank, con-
ceived the idea for the Convention in 1961 in the wake of earlier ef-
forts by the OECD to create a framework for the protection of in-
ternational investment.34  Broches convened consultative 
 
30 Id. 
31 See, e.g., The Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions (Greece v. Gr. Brit.), 1924 
P.C.I.J. (ser. B) No. 3, at 6–7 (Aug. 30), available at http://www.worldcourts.com/ 
pcij/eng/decisions/1924.08.30_mavrommatis.htm (discussing that although the 
dispute was between a private individual and a State, its status changed when the 
home State of the private individual took up the case).  This case states: 
It is an elementary principle of international law that a State is entitled to 
protect its subjects, when injured by acts contrary to international law 
committed by another State, from whom they have been unable to obtain 
satisfaction through the ordinary channels. By taking up the case of one 
of its subjects and by resorting to diplomatic action or international judi-
cial proceedings on his behalf, a State is in reality asserting its own 
rights. . . . 
Id. at 7. 
32 See ICSID Convention, supra note 1. See also Danny Allen (unpublished 
manuscript, on file with author) (summarizing the history of the Convention). 
33 Allen, supra note 32, at 2. 
34 REED ET AL., supra note 6, at 1. 
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conferences of legal experts throughout the world to discuss the 
proposition, and the World Bank staff then devised a draft of the 
Convention.  It was submitted to the President of the bank for cir-
culation to all member States; the mandatory minimum of twenty 
States ratified the Convention so that it entered into effect on Octo-
ber 14, 1966.35  The World Bank’s status as a neutral financial in-
termediary between capital-importing countries and capital-
exporting countries also helped the Convention gain traction as ac-
tualizing what it purported to embody.36 
The drafters of the Convention thus were highly concerned 
with the need for even-handedness when establishing ICSID, seek-
ing to maintain a careful balance between the interests of investors 
and those of host States.37  This balance was hardly surprising 
given that the Convention’s purpose was to devise a system able to 
promote mutual confidence between States and foreign investors 
and to stimulate flow of private capital into countries wishing to 
attract it.38  The provisions of the Convention were adapted for 
cases to be brought by either a State or private party.  The Conven-
tion provided facilities to both host states and investors, and al-
lowed proceedings to be initiated by either party.39  ICSID is thus 
 
35 Id. at 2. 
36 Allen, supra note 32, at 3. 
37 See Ibrahim F.I. Shihata, ICSID Arbitration: The Institution’s Point of View, in 
PRIVATE INVESTMENTS ABROAD—PROBLEMS AND SOLUTIONS IN INTERNATIONAL 
BUSINESS IN 1993 16-1, 16-2 (Carol J. Holgren, ed. 1993) (explaining the purposes 
and goals of the Convention).  See also Int’l Bank for Reconstruction and Dev. 
[IBRD], Report of the Executive Directors on the Convention on the Settlement of In-
vestment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States (March 18, 1965), com-
piled in ICSID CONVENTION, REGULATIONS AND RULES 35, 41 (1993), 
http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/basicdoc/basicdoc.htm [hereinafter Report of 
the Board].  The Report of the Executive Directors of the Convention states: 
While the broad objective of the Convention is to encourage a larger flow 
of private international investment, the provisions of the Convention 
maintain a careful balance between the interests of investors and those of 
host States. Moreover, the Convention permits the institution of proceed-
ings by host States as well as by investors and the Executive Directors 
have constantly had in mind that the provisions of the Convention 
should be equally adapted to the requirements of both cases. 
38 See Shihata, supra note 37, at 16-2 (“The Centre’s founders[‘] . . . broad pur-
pose was to devise a dispute settlement system capable of ‘promoting an atmos-
phere of mutual confidence’ between States and foreign investors and thus ‘stimu-
lating a larger flow of private International capital into those countries which 
wish to attract it.’”). 
39 See id. at 16-3 (describing provisions of the Convention). 
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unique in that it affords a private party direct access to an interna-
tional system of dispute resolution in which it may participate on 
an equal footing against a State.40 
However, it is important to remember that the primary pur-
pose behind the creation of ICSID was the promotion of foreign in-
vestment.  The Report of the Executive Directors on the Conven-
tion emphasized promoting global economic development through 
private international investment.41  The founders of the Convention 
hoped that offering “a neutral dispute resolution forum both to in-
vestors that are (rightly or wrongly) wary of nationalistic decisions 
by local courts and to host States that are (rightly or wrongly) wary 
of self-interested actions by foreign investors” would encourage 
investment.42  As such, the initial language of the Convention,—
“[c]onsidering the need for international cooperation for economic 
development, and the role of private international investment 
therein”43—reflects this attempt by a financial intermediary both to 
further the interests of all its member States, which includes devel-
oped and developing countries, and to promote economic devel-
opment. 
3. OVERVIEW OF ICSID REQUIREMENTS AND CONCERNS 
The ICSID Convention is entirely voluntary and guarantees all 
parties upon their initial consent to ICSID arbitration the ability to 
take full advantage of procedural rules specifically adapted to their 
needs.44  The administration of these rules will also be exempt from 
 
40 Id. 
41 The report emphasized the theme of “partnership and interdependence 
between industrialized and developing countries, protected by a regime of truly 
independent dispute resolution . . . .” REED ET AL., supra note 6, at 2. 
42 Id. at 3. 
43 ICSID Convention, supra note 1, Preamble. 
44 Georges R. Delaume, ICSID Arbitration and the Courts, 77 AM. J. INT’L. L. 784, 
784–85 (1983).  See also ICSID Convention, supra note 1, art. 42.  The Convention 
states: 
The Tribunal shall decide a dispute in accordance with such rules of law 
as may be agreed by the parties. In the absence of such agreement, the 
Tribunal shall apply the law of the Contracting State party to the dispute 
(including its rules on the conflict of laws) and such rules of international 
law as may be applicable. 
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the scrutiny or control of domestic courts of Contracting States to 
the Convention.45 
3.1. Jurisdiction 
The Convention defines jurisdictional requirements in Article 
25.46  It outlines who is subject to the Convention, the types of con-
flicts covered by the Convention, and what constitutes consent to 
the arbitration. 
3.1.1. Personal Jurisdiction 
ICSID, as previously noted, was created to settle disputes be-
tween a Contracting State and a national47 of another Contracting 
State.48  As such, only disputes between a contract state and a na-
tional of another Contracting State may be submitted to ICSID ar-
bitration. 
However, the Convention excludes disputes between interna-
tional persons, disputes between private law persons, and disputes 
between a Contracting State and one of its own nationals.49 
For cases in which the investment dispute arises out of prob-
lems concerning the host country’s sovereign debt, as in many of 
the Argentine cases, this divide can be somewhat problematic.  If 
ICSID primarily arbitrates disputes between contracting States and 
nationals of other contracting States, what should be done in cases 
where some of the large number of creditors are nationals of States 
that have not ratified the Convention?  According to Steven 
Schwarcz, an unresolved dispute between a creditor and debtor-
State might disrupt an overall settlement among all creditors.  As 
Professor Schwarcz suggests, creditors thus would most likely pre-
fer that the Convention authorize arbitration between Contracting 
States and any creditor that subjects itself to the tribunal’s jurisdic-
tion.  Indeed, ICSID has taken this course since 1978 by allowing 
 
45 See Delaume, supra note 44, at 785 (explaining the operation of this “rule of 
abstention”). 
46 ICSID Convention, supra note 1, art. 25. 
47 The term national applies to both physical and juridical persons. Id. art. 
25(2). 
48 Id. art. 25(1). 
49 Delaume, supra note 44, at 793. 
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arbitration between States and nationals of non-contracting States 
that consent to arbitration about their investment disputes.50 
3.1.2. Subject Matter Jurisdiction 
The Convention retains subject matter jurisdiction in the case of 
any “legal dispute arising directly out of an investment . . . .”51  The 
definition of investment, however, has been disputed.  Neither the 
legislative history of the Convention nor the language of the Con-
vention itself supplies the precise definition of the term, even 
though it is a central element of the Convention as a whole.52  This 
lack of definition was a deliberate decision by the drafters, who 
viewed the addition of a definition as too restrictive.53  When the 
Convention was drafted, most investments took the form of con-
cessions, joint ventures, or loans made by private financial institu-
tions to foreign public entities and arrangements regarding indus-
trial property rights.  More recently, new investment associations 
have developed, including profit sharing, service and management 
contracts, contracts for the sale and erection of industrial plants, 
turn-key contracts, international leasing arrangements, and agree-
ments for the transfer of know-how and of technology.54  Accord-
ing to Georges Delaume, a Senior Legal Advisor at the World 
Bank, this contemporary context requires an economic concept of 
investment to be progressively substituted for the traditional no-
tion of investment in capital.  Accordingly, ICSID tribunals have 
recently found disputes to be subject to the Convention where, at a 
minimum, the investment: had a significant duration; provided a 
measure of return to the investor; involved an element of risk on 
both sides; involved a substantial commitment on the part of the 
investor; and was significant to the State’s development.55 
3.2. Consent 
Consent by the parties involved in a dispute subject to ICSID 
jurisdiction is perhaps key to the Convention’s effectiveness.56  In 
 
50 Steven L. Schwarcz, Sovereign Debt Restructuring: A Bankruptcy Reorganiza-
tion Approach, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 956, 1027 (2000). 
51 ICSID Convention, supra note 1, art. 25(1). 
52 Delaume, supra note 44, at 795. 
53 REED ET AL., supra note 6, at 14. 
54 Delaume, supra note 44, at 795. 
55 REED ET AL., supra note 6, at 15. 
56 It is important to note that both ratification and consent are generally nec-
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their 1965 Report on the Convention, the executive directors of 
ICSID called consent the “cornerstone of the jurisdiction of the 
Centre.”57  Indeed, Articles 25 and 26 rely heavily on the idea of 
consent as the threshold for obtaining jurisdiction.  In Article 25, 
the Convention requires parties to the dispute to “consent in writ-
ing to submit to the Centre.  When the parties have given their 
consent, no party may withdraw its consent unilaterally.”58  The 
Convention deems its jurisdiction absolute, in the language of Ar-
ticle 26.  However, it simultaneously provides States with the op-
tion of limiting ICSID jurisdiction up front, by stating that States 
shall be: 
deemed [to have consented] to such arbitration to the ex-
clusion of any other remedy.  A Contracting State may re-
quire the exhaustion of local administrative or judicial 
remedies as a condition of its consent to arbitration under 
this Convention. 59 
Once parties consent to ICSID arbitration, the Convention has ex-
clusive jurisdiction for those disputes which arise under its aus-
pices. 
Consent to ICSID arbitrations has been growing.  Although 
consent to arbitration must be in writing by both parties, a specific 
form of the consent is neither specified within the Convention nor 
limited by case law.  Consent must be explicit, however, not 
 
essary to bring arbitration in front of ICSID.  A country may ratify the Conven-
tion, but the measures necessary to make any treaty effective in a domestic legal 
sphere will vary depending on the country’s constitutional system.  Some coun-
tries require domestic legislation incorporating the treaties into domestic law.  In 
others, treaties that have been duly promulgated internally in principle may be 
applied without the legislation.  Some countries require implementing legislation 
in order to bring domestic legislation in line with treaty obligations.  Article 69 of 
the Convention concerns the duty of Contracting States to take any measures nec-
essary in their domestic law to carry out their obligations under the Convention, 
but does not deal with consent.   Articles 25 and 26 discuss voluntary consent to 
jurisdiction, which no Contracting State is obliged to give.  However, offering 
such consent would make the Convention more effective.  This Section discusses 
this concept of voluntary consent to ICSID given by States rather than ratification 
of the Convention or implementation of the Convention’s obligations.   For an in-
depth discussion of Consent, see CHRISTOPH SCHREUER, THE ICSID CONVENTION:  A 
COMMENTARY 201-03, 1277-80 (2001) [hereinafter A COMMENTARY]. 
57 Report of the Board, supra note 37, at 43. 
58 ICSID Convention, supra note 1, art. 25(1). 
59 Id. art. 26. 
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merely construed.60 It may be given in advance and with respect to 
a defined class of future disputes or with respect to an existing dis-
pute.61   
Thus, while a large number of countries have signed the Con-
vention within the last two decades, giving broad consent to its ju-
risdiction, other forms of consent have also proliferated.  In prac-
tice, consent is given in one of three ways.  First, it is given 
unambiguously via a consent clause in a direct agreement between 
the parties, such as via a concession contract.  Second, consent to 
ICSID jurisdiction can be achieved through a standing offer within 
a treaty between the host State and the investor’s State of national-
ity.  Bilateral investment treaties and regional multilateral treaties 
(MITs), such as NAFTA, often contain clauses offering access to 
ICSID.  These offers of arbitration must be fulfilled by an accep-
tance on the part of the investor.  The third method of giving con-
sent to ICSID arbitration as a means of dispute settlement is 
through a standing offer within a provision in the national legisla-
tion of the host State, most often through investment codes.  As 
with bilateral and multilateral treaties, an offer of ICSID arbitration 
in national legislation must be accepted by the foreign investor.  
According to Schreuer, recent cases that have come before ICSID 
show a trend from consent through direct agreement between the 
parties to consent through a general offer by the host State, which 
is later accepted by the investor often simply through instituting 
proceedings.62  
Consent to ICSID jurisdiction can be granted exclusively or can 
be included in a treaty, law or contract as one of several options.  
Consent may be given with respect to existing or future disputes.  
In the majority of cases, an agreement between the parties may re-
cord the consent to ICSID arbitration through a promissory clause 
to dispose of future disputes via ICSID arbitration.  Although in 
many cases an ICSID arbitration clause is included in an invest-
ment agreement, consent need not be recorded in a single instru-
ment.  Rather, it can be expressed through a series of letters or 
 
60 See United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, New York, 
Geneva, March 2003, Course on Dispute Settlement, U.N. Doc. 
UNCTAD/EDM/Misc.232 (prepared by Christoph Schreuer), available at 
http://r0.unctad.org/disputesettlement/course.htm [hereinafter Course on Dis-
pute Settlement]. 
61 REED ET AL., supra note 6, at 22. 
62  Course on Dispute Settlement, supra note 60, at 16. 
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documents between the parties.63  Consent may also result from a 
unilateral offer by a party.64  Some domestic laws specifically state 
that the consent of the State to ICSID jurisdiction is constituted by 
Articles referring to the Convention.65    Promissory clauses are also 
(rarely) used to submit disputes already arisen between the par-
ties.66 
Consent to ICSID arbitration via investment laws, BITs,67  and 
MITs with ICSID clauses has steadily been growing.68   As of May 
2000, States had consented in advance to submit their disputes to 
ICSID in approximately 20 investment laws and in over 900 bilat-
eral investment treaties.69   ICSID arbitration has similarly emerged 
as a mechanism for settling disputes under recent multilateral trea-
ties, including NAFTA, the Energy Charter, the Cartagena Free 
Trade Agreement, and the Colonia Investment Protocol of Merco-
sur.70 
The Convention requires that both parties consent in writing to 
the dispute.  Until now, this article has primarily discussed the 
ways in which a country may consent to ICSID jurisdiction, but an 
investor must consent as well.  Generally, there must be a BIT or 
MIT between the host State and the State of the investor’s national-
ity. However, the extension of an ICSID clause in a BIT of the host 
State to an investor of a non-signatory State is possible on the basis 
of a most-favored nation clause in a treaty between the investor’s 
home State and the host State.71 
 
63 See Delaume, supra note 44, at 792 (detailing the methods of consenting to 
the Convention). 
64 Id. 
65 According to Schreuer, provisions to this effect are found in the national 
legislation of the Central African Republic, the Côte d’Ivoire, and Mauritania.  A 
COMMENTARY, supra note 56, at 200. 
66 See Course on Dispute Settlement, supra note 60 at 7. 
67 See discussion infra Section 5. 
68 See Shihata, supra note 37, at 16–23 (analyzing the growth of acceptance of 
the ICSID system). 
69 Schwarcz, supra note 50, at 1025–26. 
70 Moreland, supra note 3, at 18.  For an in-depth discussion of consent to the 
Convention via NAFTA, the Energy Charter Treaty, Mercosur, and the Cartagena 
Free Trade Agreement, see A COMMENTARY, supra note 56, at 224. 
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3.3. Exclusivity of Remedy 
A corollary to consent, and another key factor behind the Con-
vention’s ability to remain effective, is the exclusive nature of 
ICSID’s jurisdiction.  The Report of the Board presumed that, ab-
sent evidence of a State’s reservation of rights to different recourse, 
signatories of the Convention intended ICSID to have exclusive ju-
risdiction over pertinent investment disputes. According to the 
Report: 
[W]hen a State and an investor agree to have recourse to 
arbitration, and do not reserve the right to have recourse to 
other remedies or require the prior exhaustion of other 
remedies, the intention of the parties is to have recourse to 
arbitration to the exclusion of any other remedy. . . . [T]he 
second sentence [of Article 26] explicitly recognizes the 
right of a State to require the prior exhaustion of local 
remedies.72 
As a result, by ratifying and then consenting to the Convention, 
Contracting States limit their ability to remove any particular, in-
dividual issues from ICSID’s jurisdiction. 
Indeed, ICSID awards are final and binding.  They are subject 
to the limited remedies of rectification, interpretation, revision and 
annulment, but not to appeal or review by national courts.73  Con-
sent to arbitration under the Convention is thus “deemed to ex-
clude recourse to any other remedy.”74  The restriction requires 
that the domestic courts of contracting states abstain from taking 
any action that might interfere with the autonomous and exclusive 
character of ICSID arbitration.75 
The exclusivity of the Convention can be seen as a form of pro-
tection for the contracting States from having to defend suits in in-
numerable, unfriendly forums.76  Because the consent to ICSID ar-
bitration is just as binding on the investor as it is on a State in a 
dispute, a State can be assured that the investor cannot bring an ac-
 
72 Report of the Board, supra note 37, at 45. 
73 REED ET AL., supra note 6, at 8. 
74 Shihata, supra note 37, at 16-3. 
75 Delaume, supra note 44, at 785. 
76 However, related suits may still be brought in domestic courts, and multi-
state ICSID claims may be brought under different Bilateral Investment Treaties 
(BITs). 
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tion in a non-ICSID international forum, even in his own State.77  In 
the case of an adverse decision by ICSID, a domestic court could 
resume hearing a case that had fallen within domestic jurisdiction 
but was removed for also falling within ICSID.  However, to do so, 
it must have an independent basis for jurisdiction over the people 
and subject matter.78  As a result, the only role of domestic courts 
in these disputes is regarding the recognition and enforcement of 
ICSID awards.79 
The exclusivity of jurisdiction also restricts the State whose na-
tional is a party to an agreement.  In such cases, the State may not 
espouse the case of its national, give that national diplomatic pro-
tection, or bring an international claim in respect of the dispute.80  
Drafters reasoned that in exchange for access to a truly interna-
tional system, investors should not be able to ask their home States 
to espouse their claims, and the home States should not be permit-
ted to do so.81  Article 27 thus states that “[n]o Contracting State 
shall give diplomatic protection, or bring an international claim” 
on behalf of one of its nationals.82 
The exclusivity of remedy may create some tension between 
Contracting States and investors in situations of major economic 
distress because it limits the options a Contracting State possesses 
after it consents to ICSID arbitration.  While exclusivity gives in-
vestors confidence that countries may be held accountable for their 
actions (as it was intended to), it may be undesirable for Contract-
ing States because it restricts countries from removing measures 
 
77  Delaume, supra note 44, at 791. 
78 Id. at 785. 
79 Id. 
80 ICSID Convention, supra note 1, art. 27.  Article 27 states: 
(1) No Contracting State shall give diplomatic protection, or bring an in-
ternational claim, in respect of a dispute which one of its nationals and 
another Contracting State shall have consented to submit or shall have 
submitted to arbitration under this Convention, unless such other Con-
tracting State shall have failed to abide by and comply with the award 
rendered in such dispute. 
(2) Diplomatic protection, for the purposes of paragraph (1), shall not in-
clude informal diplomatic exchanges for the sole purpose of facilitating a 
settlement of the dispute. 
See also Delaume, supra note 44, at 791 (discussing the restrictions on Contracting 
States). 
81 Shihata, supra note 37, at 16-5. 
82 ICSID Convention, supra note 1, art. 27. 
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taken by the State for legitimate policy, social, or economic reasons 
from the Convention’s reach.   
3.4. Recognition and Enforcement 
Awards granted by ICSID tribunals are binding on both parties 
and subject to only limited appeal.83   They are final awards, and 
they are often expressed in terms of res judicata.84   Once an ICSID 
award has been rendered, the parties may not seek remedy on the 
same dispute in another forum.85   An ICSID award may be used as 
a defense against an action in the same matter in front of another 
judicial forum, even if that other forum would otherwise have ju-
risdiction over the matter.86    
During the Convention’s drafting, it was generally expected 
that Contracting States would comply voluntarily with awards, 
and thus enforcement would not be a practical problem.87   Not 
only does an award represent a treaty obligation for the Contract-
ing State, but the obligation would be backed up by the State’s 
concern for its reputation as a place of investment and by the re-
vival of the right to diplomatic protection by the investor’s State of 
nationality.88   However, the Convention articulated a mechanism 
for recognition and enforcement of awards equally against both 
parties, even though it was originally established in order to en-
sure that the investors would comply with awards.89   Article 54 
states that all Contracting States, not just parties to the dispute, 
 
83 See ICSID Convention, supra note 1, art. 53 (“The award shall be binding on 
the parties and shall not be subject to any appeal or to any other remedy except 
those provided for in this Convention.”). 
 84 See A COMMENTARY, supra note 56, at 1079 (discussing the binding nature of 
an award) 
 85 See Id. at 1077, 1085 (discussing Article 53 of the Convention and the res 
judicata effects of awards) 
86 Id.   However, it is important to note that this only applies if the ICSID tri-
bunal has yielded a decision on the merits.  Where a tribunal declines jurisdiction, 
a party may take its claim to another forum.  Id. at 1086. 
87 Id. at 1088. 
88 Id. at 1102.  Article 27 of the Convention states that no Contracting State 
shall give diplomatic protection, or bring an international claim, regarding a dis-
pute between one of its nationals and another Contracting State, unless such other 
Contracting State shall have failed to abide by and comply with the award ren-
dered in such dispute.  ICSID Convention, supra note 1, art. 27. 
89 A COMMENTARY, supra note 56, at 1102 
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must recognize awards under the Convention and enforce pecuni-
ary obligations within their territories.90 
The fact that recognition and enforcement of an award may be 
sought in any State party to the ICSID Convention, coupled with 
the fact that 155 States have signed the Convention,91  practically 
ensures that all awards will be enforceable because assets located 
within any Contracting States would be thereby attachable.  In-
deed, it would be a treaty violation for a Contracting State to refuse 
to enforce an award.92  Non-compliance with Article 54 thus carries 
the consequences of State responsibility, including diplomatic pro-
tection.  According to Schreuer, “the State of the nationality of an 
investor who has prevailed in an ICSID arbitration could bring an 
international claim against a State that was not a party to the arbi-
tration but whose court and authorities have failed to recognize 
and enforce the award in violation of Art. 54.”93 
Due to the voluntary nature of joining the ICSID arbitration 
system, recognition and enforcement of the awards was a major 
concern for the drafters of the convention.  When writing the Con-
vention, the drafters wanted to ensure that both the investor and 
the State would comply with any judgment made.94   Although Ar-
ticle 27 allows the right of espousal should a host State fail to com-
ply with an award against it, it also states that the host State will 
then be exposed to the possibility of proceedings against it in the 
International Court of Justice (ICJ) for its violation of its ICSID 
treaty obligations.95   The Convention also requires investors to 
comply with adverse awards rendered in Article 54, which states 
that all Contracting States are licensed to enforce such awards “in 
or through its federal courts and may provide that such courts 
shall treat the award as if it were a final judgment of the courts of a 
constituent state.”96   It is important to note that an ICSID award is 
a title that is immediately executable.97   All Contracting States are 
 
90 ICSID Convention, supra note 1, art. 54. 
91 See List of Contracting States, supra note 9 (listing the States that have signed 
the Convention). 
92 A COMMENTARY, supra note 56, at 1110. 
93 Id. 
94 Shihata, supra note 37, at 16-5. 
95 Id. 
96 ICSID Convention, supra note 1, art. 54. 
97 Delaume, supra note 44, at 801. 
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thus committed to enforcing the final judgments of the courts of 
the countries concerned.98 
3.5. Non-compliance and Remedies for Non-compliance 
The mechanics behind non-compliance by Contracting States 
are actually surprisingly difficult.  Because most titles are immedi-
ately executable by any Contracting State, in theory, there is little 
chance that a country with an adverse judgment against it will be 
able to completely avoid enforcement.  A country inevitably will 
have assets in a Contracting State that can be seized by that State 
for enforcement.  Moreover, political considerations, embarrass-
ment over lawsuits, or the desire to promote foreign investment 
may prompt countries to pay an award.  However, the threat of 
non-compliance with ICSID awards is not an idle one.  Although in 
some cases circumstances may lead countries to pay awards with-
out argument, these incentives do not always work. 99 
To some extent, enforcement may represent a practical diffi-
culty.  Attaching the assets of a foreign private individual or com-
pany can be an effective way to enforce judgments against private 
investors.  However, finding attachable governmental assets out-
side of the domestic borders to attach can be harder, particularly 
when the State does not possess any State-Owned-Enterprises 
(SOEs).100   Moreover, although Contracting States are bound to 
recognize ICSID awards, Article 55 of the Convention states that 
the enforcement of ICSID awards are governed by each State’s own 
laws, which in turn might give immunity to the host State from 
execution.101   According to Choi, in 1997, in two out of three cases 
where enforcement of an ICSID award was sought, parties could 
not receive payment of the award because the funds they sought to 
attach did not qualify for attachment under national laws.102   Thus, 
when a Contracting State does not comply with an award, a plea of 
sovereign “immunity from execution might effectively bar . . . exe-
cution against that state.”103   Although a private investor may at-
 
98 Shihata, supra note 37, at 16-5. 
99 Susan Choi, Judicial Enforcement of Arbitration Awards Under the ICSID and 
New York Conventions, 28 N.Y.U. J. INT’L. L. & POL. 175, 213 (1995-96). 
100 See Schwarcz, supra note 50, at 1029 (discussing suits and judgments for 
foreign debtor-States). 
101 Choi, supra note 99, at 180. 
102 Id. at 181. 
103 Delaume, supra note 44, at 801. 
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tempt to circumvent the problem by seeking enforcement in a State 
with narrow immunity doctrine, it may still be difficult to prove 
that the assets fall within the category not considered immune.104  
Contracting States do not surrender their right to sovereign 
immunity via the Convention.  However, they also cannot neglect 
their treaty commitments.  If a Contracting State pleaded immunity 
in order to frustrate enforcement of an ICSID award, the State 
would be violating its obligation under the Convention to comply 
with the award.  For such a violation of treaty obligations, a State 
would likely be exposed to various sanctions provided for in the 
Convention.105   Failure to comply would restore the right of the 
Contracting State whose national is the award creditor to either 
give that national its diplomatic protection or to bring a claim 
against the other State on the private investor’s behalf.106   A viola-
tion of treaty obligations would also allow the State whose national 
is involved to bring suit against the non-complying State at the 
ICJ.107  
Indeed, in practice, most awards are satisfied through volun-
tary compliance of the parties.108   Although a State may possess 
the right to bring a lawsuit against the non-complying State on be-
half of one its nationals, it would likely “be reluctant to do so for 
political reasons.”109   As Schwarcz argues, it is in all parties’ best 
interests to adhere to the Convention.  Its provisions were estab-
lished for the benefit of both the investors and the States.  Retain-
ing access to capital market funding in the future depends on com-
 
104 See Choi, supra note 99, at 213 (discussing how attempts at enforcing 
awards have played out in cases in both France and the United States). 
105 Delaume, supra note 44, at 801. 
106 See ICSID Convention, supra note 1, art. 27(1) (stating that “[n]o Contract-
ing State shall give diplomatic protection . . . unless such other Contracting State 
shall have failed to abide by and comply with the award rendered in such dis-
pute”). 
107 See id. art. 64 (“Any dispute arising between Contracting States concerning 
the interpretation or application of this Convention which is not settled by nego-
tiation shall be referred to the International Court of Justice by the application of 
any party to such dispute, unless the States concerned agree to another method of 
settlement.”).  See also Delaume, supra note 44, at 801–02 (discussing the ramifica-
tions of non-compliance). 
108 See Schwarcz, supra note 50, at 1023 (“Outside of expropriation cases, few 
disputes arise between sovereign States and foreign private parties.”). 
109 Id. at 1023–24. 
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pliance.110  As a result, both parties have a vested interest in seeing 
awards respected. 
Although many countries voluntarily comply with ICSID 
awards, Argentina has shown some reluctance to honor the poten-
tial awards against it.111   The Ministry of Economy of Argentina is 
on record stating that the decisions of the arbitration tribunals in 
the more than thirty ICSID arbitrations pending against the coun-
try would be “subject to local court review in Argentina if they 
‘disturb public order because they are unconstitutional, illegal or 
unreasonable or if they were handed down in violation of the 
terms and conditions undertaken by the parties.’”112    The country 
is in the unenviable position of potentially being liable for an ex-
traordinary amount of money in awards.  If Argentina cannot or 
will not honor these awards, it will be abandoning its treaty obliga-
tions.   
There are many potential consequences to a refusal of Argen-
tina to comply.  As discussed above, states with liberal immunity 
clauses may allow investors to attach assets within their borders.  
Argentina may be unable to access international capital markets 
due to a lack of investor confidence.  Although Argentina’s situa-
tion is to some extent a unique one, and so may not signify a major 
flaw in the ICSID enforcement system as whole, the situation is 
also troubling because it represents the potential problems that 
many countries could face when undergoing a massive economic 
collapse. 
4. THE CALVO CLAUSE AND LATIN AMERICA 
Initially, many Latin American countries resisted joining the 
ICSID convention as a result of the widespread adoption of the 
Calvo Doctrine and the inclusion of “Calvo Clauses” in investment 
contracts.113  Named for the Argentine diplomat and jurist, Carlos 
Calvo, the Calvo Doctrine states that legal disputes involving pri-
 
110 Id. at 1028. 
111 See discussions infra Sections 1, 5, 6 (regarding Argentina’s current posi-
tion). 
112 Edward Baldwin et al., Limits to Enforcement of ICSID Awards, 23 J. INT’L 
ARBITRATION 1, 2 (2006), available at http://www.milbank.com/NR/rdonlyres/ 
CF3F1236-AA39-405F-8086-A1E60AD104B2/0/ 
0106_Nolan_Journal_of_Intl_Arbitration.pdf. 
113 See Baker & Yoder, supra note 2, at 75 (discussing Latin American reliance 
on the Calvo doctrine). 
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vate individuals conducting business in a foreign country should 
be resolved by local remedies rather than by international legal 
remedies.114   The doctrine was aimed at preventing abuses from 
invocations of diplomatic protection.  The Calvo Clause was in-
serted in many documents to ensure that all chance of diplomatic 
intervention was eliminated and that an alien was truly on an 
equal legal stance as a national.115 
Argentina subscribed to the theory that inserting Calvo Clauses 
into treaties and contracts was necessary to preserve sovereignty 
and independent authority over its investment interests.  A typical 
Calvo Clause contained a commitment to submit all disputes to lo-
cal courts and a provision that defined the scope of the contractual 
stipulation.  Also included in the Clause was a waiver of the pro-
tection by the home State of the investor and a surrender of all fu-
ture claims based on rights under international law.116  However, 
the Clause did not bar an international suit against the State assert-
ing its protection in the event of unjust procedural delay or mani-
fest denial of justice.117 
The Calvo Clause was utilized particularly by Latin American 
countries.  In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, pri-
vate investors supplied large amounts of capital into the develop-
ment of natural resources in Latin America.118  Investors often dis-
trusted the justice systems of the countries in which they were 
investing, and therefore requested protection by their home coun-
tries.119  The intervention of these governments on investors’ behalf 
created a body of precedent that eventually “established the ability 
to appeal to the diplomatic protection of one’s home government 
as a right of a foreign national in a Latin American country.”120  
Eventually, the extent to which private investors were able to take 
a strong position for or against the insertion of Calvo Clauses de-
 
114 See Id. at 75, 90 (defining the Calvo doctrine). 
115 According to Baker and Yoder, the Calvo Clause took several forms.  It 
could exist as an express agreement in the contract or deemed to be an implied 
contract term in those States that have included Calvo Clauses in their constitu-
tions and statues.  Id. at 91. 
116 David Graham, The Calvo Clause: Its Current Status as a Contractual Renun-
ciation of Diplomatic Protection, 6 TEX. INT’L L.F. 289, 290 (1970). 
117 Id. at 293, 304. 
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pended on whether they would be able to rely on their govern-
ments to support them in any disputes. 
Through much of the twentieth century Latin American coun-
tries remained suspicious of the arbitral, as opposed to the judicial, 
process. 121  As such, the countries generally inserted Calvo Clauses 
into their documents and resisted signing international treaties that 
would require arbitration.  However, since 1980 this has begun to 
change.122  Business-oriented Latin American countries have rec-
ognized that the Convention is a cheaper, more flexible, and speed-
ier alternative to traditional, civil court litigation.  The Convention 
enhanced the traditional devices for attracting foreign investors—
such as tax breaks, customs preference, etc.—by offering institu-
tional stability assurances that the traditional investment induce-
ments would not be withdrawn suddenly.123 
According to Paul Szasz, rigid adherence to the Calvo Doctrine 
and the principle of opposition to arbitrating foreign investment 
disputes were diluted by the conclusion of Investment Guaranties 
Agreements,124 which operate in the same capacity as BITs, be-
tween the United States and a number of Latin American States re-
quiring arbitration for the settlement of disputes.125  As more and 
more countries have become signatories of the Convention, Latin 
American countries have also gradually opened up.  Today, with 
the notable exceptions of Mexico and Brazil, the vast majority of 
Latin American countries are parties to ICSID.126 
Because so many of these countries, in particular Argentina, 
wished to attract foreign investment to their economies, it was in 
their best interests to abandon the use of the nationalistic Calvo 
Clause in favor of conceding to the investor-friendly ICSID re-
quirements.  And yet, it is precisely because ICSID is so investor-
friendly that Argentina has begun to question its adherence to the 
Convention.  Although it has not reverted to the Calvo Doctrine, 
Argentina has attempted to ensure that Calvo-like protections of 
sovereignty are protected under ICSID as well.  Indeed, the inser-
 
121 Paul Szasz, The Investment Disputes Convention and Latin America, 11 VA. J. 
INT’L L. 256, 262 (1970). 
122 See List of Contracting States, supra note 9, (providing a record of when each 
Latin American state finally chose to sign the ICSID Convention). 
123 Szasz, supra note 121, at 264. 
124 See infra Section 5 (discussing similar bilateral investment treaties). 
125 Szasz, supra note 121, at 264. 
126 List of Contracting States, supra note 9. 
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tion of Article 27 in the ICSID Convention gives many of the same 
protections that the Calvo Clauses did.  Article 27 grants States 
“the possibility of an effective (because authorized by each Con-
tracting State through its ratification of the Convention) waiver by 
an investor of the right to his State’s diplomatic protection with re-
gard to any matter that the host State is willing to take to the Cen-
tre for arbitration.”127  As a result, ICSID potentially offers Argen-
tina the same protections that the Calvo Doctrine does. 
5. BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES AND THEIR CONTRIBUTION TO 
ICSID ARBITRATION 
Most arbitration cases dealt with at ICSID are the consequence 
of BIT provisions that contain a general offer or acceptance by Con-
tracting States to settle investment disputes by ICSID arbitration.128  
Over the last few decades, BITs increasingly have become an im-
portant aspect of international trade relations,129 and have pro-
vided a basis for implementing the ICSID system.  Contracting 
States often provide a generalized consent to ICSID within the text 
of BITs as a means of protecting investors. According to Vinuesa, 
ICSID tribunals have held that the generic consent to submit to 
ICSID jurisdiction contained within BITs constitutes consent to 
ICSID arbitration as required by Article 25 of the Convention.  An 
investor covered by that BIT is assumed to have consented to 
ICSID jurisdiction after the dispute has arisen and the investor has 
requested ICSID arbitration.130  
 However, consent via a BIT does not automatically corre-
spond to ICSID consent.  After any objection to ICSID jurisdiction, 
a tribunal will test jurisdiction by examining that both the legal ju-
risdictional requirements of BITs and the ICSID Convention are 
met.  These conditions may include, among other things, satisfying 
 
127 See Szasz, supra note 121, at 261 (finding that Article 27 represents a 
waiver by an investor of the right to his State’s diplomatic protection); Baker & 
Yoder, supra note 2, at 76 (noting that the recognition of certain attributes of the 
Calvo doctrine led to the incorporation of a modified version of the Latin Ameri-
can Calvo Clause into Article 27 of the Convention). 
128 Raul Emilio Vinuesa, Bilateral Investment Treaties and the Settlement of In-
vestment Disputes under ICSID: The Latin American Experience, 8 L. & BUS. REV. AM. 
501, 502 (2002). 
129 See generally Bernard Kishoiyian, The Utility of Bilateral Investment Treaties 
in the Formulation of Customary International Law, 14 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 327 (1994) 
(analyzing the advent and rise of the use of BITs in international trade). 
130 Vinuesa, supra note 128, at 503. 
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two separate definitions each of both protected investment and ju-
ridical persons subject to protection.  Vinuesa argues that this set of 
requirements acts as a double filter in order to confirm ICSID ju-
risdiction. 131 
BITs have proliferated as a consequence of the international 
move towards a market economy; foreign investment was seen as 
key to integrating developing economies into the global economy.  
Although BITs generated reciprocal rights and duties among 
states, they generally did not directly address how the private in-
vestor would be affected by disputes.132  Like ICSID, most BITs ex-
press the desire of States to promote investment through the crea-
tion of favorable conditions.133  As such, BITs created a network of 
legal provisions to deal with promotion and protection of foreign 
investments, and bind all of the related countries closer together.134 
In the last 20 years, BITs have become a conduit for countries to 
encourage, if not mandate, the use of arbitration to settle invest-
ment disputes.135  In fact, as of 2002, most arbitration cases dealt 
with at ICSID were the consequence of BIT provisions containing 
an offer or acceptance by Contracting States to settle investment 
disputes via ICSID arbitrations.136  Although a State was still re-
quired to be a party to the ICSID Convention for the case to be 
brought under ICSID rules, inserting BIT consent clauses was a 
means of gaining explicit consent to ICSID arbitration.  The Con-
tracting State consented via their insertion of the clause, and the 
foreign private investors consented via any later signal of consent, 
which was generally contractual in nature or was assumed by the 
request for ICSID arbitration.137  ICSID arbitration tribunals that 
deal with BITs assume that the jurisdiction is based on the consent 
of the parties under Article 25 of the Convention138 and that the BIT 
 
131 For an in-depth discussion of meeting ICSID and BIT jurisdictional re-
quirements, see generally Vinuesa, supra note 128. 
132 Id. 
133 Id. 
134 Id. at 505. 
135 See Emmanuel Gaillard, International Arbitration Law: ‘Vivendi’ and Bilateral 
Investment Treaty Arbitration, 229 N.Y.L.J. 3 (2003) (referencing the “significant pro-
liferation of the number of ICSID arbitrations initiated on the basis of BITs (15 out 
of new 19 cases referred to ICSID arbitration in 2002, more than in any previous 
year)”. 
136 Vinuesa, supra note 128, at 502. 
137 Id. at 503. 
138 ICSID Convention, supra note 1, art. 25. 
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itself constitutes consent to ICSID arbitration.139  It is important to 
note, however, that consent in the BIT does not automatically 
amount to consent under ICSID; each treaty’s individual consent 
requirements must be met.140 
BITs have been particularly germane to the change in many 
Latin American countries’ stances regarding the use of arbitration.  
Like other States, Latin American countries have entered into bilat-
eral agreements with developed countries to promote private for-
eign investment.141  However, unlike other countries, such agree-
ments represent a significant change in policy away from the 
protectionism represented by the inclusion of Calvo Clauses in in-
vestment contracts over the last half century. 
Argentina’s resistance to arbitration, in particular, shaped ne-
gotiations of BITs regarding how disputes would be settled be-
tween States and foreign investors.  Initially, schemes were negoti-
ated to require foreign investors to submit their claims to tribunals 
within the domestic courts of the State.142  Receiving any remedy 
through international arbitration was dependent on: a period of 
time passing in which a final decision did not result from a claim 
brought to the domestic tribunal; the parties remaining in dispute 
after a final decision was rendered; or one of the parties consider-
ing that the dispute remained.  This treatment was inspired by the 
Calvo Doctrine requirement that foreign investors exhaust local 
remedies before utilizing international settlement systems.  How-
ever, when Argentina accepted the idea of ICSID authority, this 
doctrine was replaced within Argentine BITs by the recognition of 
an investor’s right to choose his jurisdiction.143 
The Argentina-United States BIT was signed in 1991 and en-
tered into force in 1994.  In many ways, it served as a precedent.  
According to Marian Nash, the “standstill and rollback of Argen-
tina’s trade-distorting performance requirements . . . were prece-
dent-setting steps in opening markets for U.S. exports, and in this 
respect, as well as in its approach to dispute settlement, the Treaty 
 
139 Vinuesa, supra note 128, at 503. 
140 Id. at 504. 
141 Id. at 505. 
142 Id. at 508. 
143 Id. at 509. 
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[served] as a model for U.S. negotiations with other South Ameri-
can countries.”144 
Argentina views BITs as within a category of treaties referred 
to within the Argentine Constitution145 as meriting higher defer-
ence than Argentine laws and statutes, yet being below the Argen-
tine Constitution in the same legal deference hierarchy.146  For a 
country with immense economic problems, and therefore with the 
potential for a large number of suits to be filed as a result of policy 
decisions made during economic turmoil, the BITs may not allow 
sovereign policy decisions to justify breaches of contract.  Where 
they do not, BITs may act much the same as the ICSID Convention 
in that they disallow the state to make policy decisions based on 
economic need.147 
However, BITs are negotiated between two sovereign nations.  
Unlike ICSID, the limited application of BITs may make it more 
likely for Argentina to negotiate with its treaty partner to resolve 
differences brought from general economic turmoil.  In bilateral 
treaties, good faith is generally a key component, and thus public 
policy can be accounted for.148  ICSID provides no such remedy. 
Moreover, although BITs are designed to encourage foreign in-
vestment flows, many BITs also contain non-precluded measures 
(NPM) clauses that actually limit investor protections in situations 
of particular importance to the investor country.149   NPMs allow a 
country to take actions inconsistent with treaty obligations when 
necessary for the maintenance of public order, national security, or 
 
144 Marian Nash, US Practice: Bilateral Investment Treaties, 87 AM. J. INT’L L. 
433, 433 (1993). 
145 The Argentine Constitution states, in part, that Congress is empowered 
“[t]o approve or reject treaties concluded with other nations and international or-
ganizations, and concordats with the Holy See. Treaties and concordats have a 
higher hierarchy than laws.” CONST. ARG., sec. 75, subsec. 22. 
146 See Horacio Rosatti, Globalization, Statism and Law (Argentina and ICSID), 
TRANSNATIONAL DISPUTE MANAGEMENT 2004, at 18, available at http:// 
www.transnational-dispute-management.com/news/tdm2-2005_2.pdf (stating 
this view of the importance of BITs). The Argentine Constitution is the supreme 
law of the land.  CONST. ARG., sec. 31. 
147 See id. at 25 for a discussion of conflating ICSID and BITs. 
148 Burdman, supra note 25, at 152. 
149 See generally William Burke-White & Andreas von Stadten, Rethinking the 
Bargain: Balancing Investor Protections with State Freedom of Action in the Interpreta-
tion and Application of Non-Precluded Measures Provisions in Bilateral Investment Trea-
ties (forthcoming 2007) (on file with author) (discussing NPM clauses in the BITs 
of Germany, India, and the United States). 
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other essential security interests.  According to Kenneth Vande-
veld, an NPM generally is included in a BIT and later invoked be-
cause “some public policy concerns of the state were deemed suffi-
ciently compelling that they justified state interference with 
market-based allocations of capital.”150   If countries are able to 
judge for themselves whether an action taken falls under the essen-
tial security interest exception to BIT protections, the consequences 
for investors are potentially far-reaching.  If taken under the guise 
of essential interests, actions against investment would be immune 
from review by any party or tribunal established under the BIT; 
“[i]n short, invocation of the essential security interests exception 
would cut off all investor remedies under the BIT.”151   
 Thus growing use of and reliance on NPM clauses has 
thereby changed the understanding of what a BIT stands for.  As 
discussed above, BITs have traditionally been valued as bargains 
that grant foreign investors international protection against host 
State usurpations in exchange for investment in those developing 
host State economies.  The use of NPMs within those treaties, how-
ever, suggests that certain “host states grant investors greater pro-
tection than they would have had under customary international 
law in exchange both for the greater prospect of investment flows 
and a greater freedom of action in times of crisis than would be 
available under customary international law.”152  
 The use and interpretation of NPM clauses has been particu-
larly important for Argentina.  In many of the ICSID cases brought 
against Argentina, Argentina has asserted its rights under the 
NPM clause of the United States-Argentina BIT as a defense 
against claims that Argentina had breached its treaty obligations.153   
Tribunals have weighed in on how to interpret NPM clauses in two 
ICSID cases brought against Argentina, CMS v. Argentina154 and 
LG&E v. Argentina,155 but with very different assessments.  In CMS, 
the tribunal found that the NPM was not appropriate in the Argen-
tine case in light of the stringent customary international law de-
 
150 Kenneth J. Vandevelde, Of Politics and Markets: The Shifting Ideology of the 
BITs, 11 INT'L TAX & BUS. L. 159, 164 (1993). 
151 Id. at 176. 
152 Burke-White & Von Stadten, supra note 149, at 5. 
153 See id. at 6 (discussing Argentina’s use of the NPM as a defense). 
154 CMS Gas Transmission Co. v. Argentine Republic, ARB/01/8 (ICSID 
2006). 
155 LG&E Energy Corp v. Argentine Republic, ARB/02/1 (ICSID 2006). 
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fense of necessity.  In LG&E, on the other hand, the tribunal found 
that because of the NPM clause in the United States-Argentina BIT, 
Argentina was not liable for any actions during the economic cri-
sis.156  As such, interpretation of NPM clauses in BIT agreements is 
far from settled, but can have sizeable effects on the outcome of 
many of the cases against Argentina. 
 6. ARGENTINA’S CURRENT POSTURE 
Far more now than in any other period in its history, Argentina 
has demonstrated a willingness to utilize arbitration as a method of 
dispute resolution.157  And yet, although Argentina has become 
more accepting of utilizing international arbitration to settle dis-
putes with foreign investors, it has not accepted the Convention’s 
jurisdiction for all disputes that could possibly qualify.158  In par-
ticular, Argentina has fought the assertion of ICSID jurisdiction in 
disputes concerning the breach of concession contracts that had fo-
rum selection clauses in favor of domestic jurisdiction.159  In at least 
one of these cases, the ICSID tribunal affirmed its jurisdiction how-
ever, “holding that claimants’ claims concerning the actions of the 
federal government of Argentina. . . were properly characterized as 
claims arising under the BIT, and not as contractual claims under 
the concession agreement.”160  As a result, even in the face of Ar-
gentina’s denial of jurisdiction, the tribunals have found that they 
retain authority to hear such cases. 
Economic and political realities have placed Argentina in an 
unsteady position with respect to how it will deal with its obliga-
tions under international treaties.  There are at least 32 pending 
cases (out of 103) involving the Argentine government in front of 
the ICSID tribunal at present.161  Many of these cases stem from the 
 
156 For an in-depth discussion of CMS and LG&E, see Burke-White & Von 
Stadten, supra note 149, at 6. 
157 See Christina Whittinghill, The Role and Regulation of International Commer-
cial Arbitration in Argentina, 38 TEX. INT’L L.J. 795, 796 (2003) (utilizing Argentina as 
a case study due to its willingness to enter into BITs in the past). 
158 See Vinuesa, supra note 128, at 515–34 (detailing descriptions of the cases 
in which Argentina, even after signing both BITs encouraging arbitration of dis-
putes and ICSID mandating arbitration, objected to ICSID jurisdiction on alterna-
tive grounds, such as the existence a forum selection clause). 
159 Id. at 525. 
160 Id. (citing the Tribunal in Compañía de Aguas del Aconquija S.A. v. Ar-
gentine Republic, ARB/97/3 (ICSID 2000), reprinted in 40 I.L.M. 426 (2001)). 
161 See ICSID Cases, supra note 10 (listing cases pending before ICSID). 
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financial turmoil that Argentina underwent in 2001, often as a re-
sult of disturbance to private stakes in public utilities.162  In gen-
eral, the private investors that have brought suit under ICSID in-
vested billions of dollars during the privatization process of the 
1990s, and now seek compensation for breaches of contract and in-
ternational law.163  A number of cases have already been tried be-
fore ICSID tribunals, generally with the finding that the emergency 
measures taken by Argentina in 2001 violated contractual promises 
within many of its investment protection proceedings.  For exam-
ple, although the tribunal in CMS recognized that Argentina had 
not singled out foreign investors for discriminatory treatment, it 
found that the government had denied such investors the stable 
regulatory framework advertised to foreigners throughout the 
1990s, which they say induced them to invest into the country.  
This failure to ensure stability and predictability amounted to a 
breach of the treaty requirement to give foreign investors “fair and 
equitable treatment.”164 
Argentina now argues that ICSID tribunals seem inclined to in-
terpret treaty protections so as to unfairly privilege foreign inves-
tors over domestic.165  The crisis affected every investor that had 
money invested within the country, regardless of nationality.  By 
awarding damages in breach of contract cases stemming from the 
Economic Emergency law in 2002, Argentina argues that ICSID has 
placed foreign investors that are covered by the ICSID agreement 
above the domestic investors that must rely on the domestic Ar-
gentine system.166 
When in economic default, countries unable to actually pay 
debts owed often use policy measures and negotiations to stabilize 
their debt.  By the strict terms of the contract with the State, indi-
vidual private investors may be entitled to more than they could 
get if negotiating with the country after default.  Under ICSID, 
domestic political measures and negotiations are of little use be-
cause private investors have a financial incentive to use ICSID to 
regain all of their losses.  Thus, with Argentina only able to control 
its domestic economic policy vis-à-vis those bringing suits in its 
own courts, Argentina is placed in the untenable position of un-
 
162 Peterson, supra note 16. 
163 Vinuesa, supra note 128, at 525. 
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evenly forcing investment losses upon its own citizens who do not 
have access to ICSID arbitration.  It is understandable, then, that 
Argentina has taken the positions (1) that a government should 
have a right under international law to take measures necessary to 
ensure its survival, and (2) that as long as those measures do not 
prejudice foreign investors, the international community should 
not determine the ability of a country to act.167 
Since ICSID’s creation, no country has refused to pay an arbi-
tral award once its determination was finalized.168  And yet, if all of 
the cases currently before ICSID were adjudicated, Argentina 
could be in an unsustainable position of being liable for more than 
$17 billion.169  Moreover, were all the potential cases against Argen-
tina adjudicated, it could be liable for nearly $100 billion.170  Fur-
thermore, because no hierarchy between cases can be easily ascer-
tained, were Argentina to try each case that is brought against it, its 
resources would be depleted by those that went to judgment first, 
thus putting it in the position of being unable to satisfy its credi-
tors.  Paradoxically, in an ICSID context where each arbitration is 
brought separately, the potential for unequal treatment is even 
higher than in other contexts because each case can be decided on 
separate grounds. 
With this as background, the view of former Argentine justice 
minister, Horacio Rosatti, that ICSID arbitral decisions should not 
be held to a higher magnitude than Argentina’s own constitution, 
and may be reviewed by Argentina’s courts for compatibility, is 
understandable.  Although this view of hierarchy goes against the 
notion that ICSID arbitrations are separate and unreviewable by 
domestic courts, it does present Argentina with a feasible means of 
self-preservation.  Blindly following an ICSID determination, like 
that in CMS, that Argentina was unjustified in its actions following 
its economic crisis effectively cedes control over its economic pol-
icy to each individual arbitration President that hears an Argentine 
case. 
Not only does questioning the power of ICSID decisions de-
crease the possibility of 20 cases each being resolved under differ-
ent reasoning, it allows Argentina to develop a single, unified 
means under which any investment disputes arising out of the 
 
167 Id. 
168 See id (discussing Argentina’s current posture). 
169 Id. 
170 German Investor Dogs Argentines on Debt, supra note 21. 
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2001 crisis may be treated, allowing all creditors domestic and for-
eign to be treated equally. 
Even though its politicians have condemned the tribunal’s re-
cent decisions, Argentina has indicated that it will honor the Con-
vention and use the narrow procedural grounds available to it in 
challenging these awards.171  For the most recent decision against 
Argentina in CMS, these legal procedures will buy Argentina some 
time before payment is expected, but if it fails to overturn the 
award, it will be in “uncharted legal waters.”172 
The way that Argentina has chosen to deal with its bondhold-
ers after default may be indicative of how the country will treat 
those that prevail in ICSID arbitrations.  Although some would ar-
gue that Argentina may comply with any awards granted in order 
to bolster its reputation and ensure that economic investment is 
properly incentivized,173 this is by no means assured.  On the con-
trary, Argentina has shown a distinct willingness to implement na-
tionalistic, populist economic policies, even in the face of alienating 
multinational organizations and discouraging investment by for-
eign companies.  Indeed, while demanding massive debt relief 
from its sovereign bond debts, Argentina simultaneously refused 
to engage in dialogue with its investor base and did not follow 
through on many of its promises to lending agencies.174  If a coun-
try is willing to alienate its bondholders, it will not likely have a 
problem treating any suits brought by private investors with 
equally short-shrift. 
In fact, the short-term interests of Argentina may indeed be bet-
ter served by addressing domestic issues of unemployment and 
poverty with its limited resources than servicing its debt to private 
foreigners.175  This is no less true for awards under ICSID arbitra-
tion.  With mounting domestic problems, Argentina has an increas-
ingly small Treasury to fulfill increasingly large obligations.  In the 
 
171 Peterson, supra note 16. 
172 Id. 
173 See Boralessa, supra note 22, at 66–67 (“[C]ompliance with awards can bol-
ster a country’s reputation for good governance and thereby lower perceived po-
litical risks for investors, enhancing its ability to participate and benefit fully from 
the global economy.  Argentina may consider this of particular importance as it is 
emerging from a financial crisis.”). 
174 For a discussion of how Argentina has treated its bondholders, see Arturo 
C. Porzecanski, From Rogue Creditors to Rogue Debtors: Implications of Argentina’s 
Default, 6 CHI. J. INT’L L. 311, 327 (2005). 
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future, the neonational tendencies of the Argentine government in 
dealing with its bondholders and ICSID parties to dispute could 
very well poison the business climate within the country.176  Ar-
gentina is left balancing immediate issues of societal welfare with 
longer issues of shoring up foreign investor confidence in Argen-
tina.  It is not remotely settled which interest will win out. 
It is important to note that, with the tribunal decision regarding 
NPMs in BITs in LG&E v. Argentina,177 Argentina may have a 
chance to win some of its cases on the merits even under ICSID 
auspices.  Because LG&E found that Argentina’s policy reaction to 
its economic crisis was “a necessary and legitimate measure” that 
excused the country from liability for the alleged violations of its 
treaty obligations,178 Argentina now has some indication that fu-
ture tribunals may find its defense of economic necessity compel-
ling.  Argentina is thus at an uncertain point in its dealings with 
ICSID.  The country has adopted a position that is highly cynical 
about ICSID and its ability to correctly balance Argentina’s inter-
ests against those of the investors.  However, it has also gained 
some traction within the system for its argument that the NPM 
clause in its BITs precludes liability for any actions taken as a mat-
ter of national security.  It is by no means assured, however, that 
any future tribunals will find similarly.  Each case must be taken 
on an ad hoc basis under ICSID, which leaves Argentina in a vul-
nerable and uncertain position. 
7. CONCLUSION 
While the ICSID Convention was established to promote for-
eign investment in countries that sought it, the fact that it exists as 
an impartial, non-political system produces a perverse result in 
situations where a country is required by extraordinary financial 
straits to work outside of ICSID’s treaty obligations.  The arbitra-
tion system, in these situations, ceases to be a neutral dispute set-
tlement system and instead hands down what amounts to pro-
investor awards because it arbitrates without regard for the aggre-
gate circumstances surrounding a “breach.” 
In the context of disputes over bond defaults, the international 
community and particularly the G-7 governments have not been 
 
176 Porzecanski, supra note 174, at 332. 
177 LG&E Energy Corp. v. Argentine Republic, ARB/02/1, 71 (ICSID 2006). 
178 Id. at  245 
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willing to take a hard stand against countries that default on their 
bonds.  On the contrary, the countries have provided a safe harbor 
for Argentina’s hard currency assets.179  If they are willing to turn a 
blind eye towards helping enforce bondholder rights, it is not in-
conceivable that they would also do so in Argentine ICSID cases 
that would otherwise be enforced.  Even though some national 
courts have signaled their willingness to uphold arbitral awards,180 
they have not done so in situations in which the sovereign country 
at issue was under immense economic distress.  And yet, 
“[d]ealing with a rogue sovereign debtor requires, in actual prac-
tice, the political willingness of other sovereign states to confront 
the errant nation, whether directly or through a supranational 
body such as the IMF.”181  For Argentina’s issues to be resolved, ei-
ther an individual country or a supranational body must be willing 
to get involved.  A solution must be constructed to apply across all 
Argentine ICSID cases, not just individual, ad hoc settlements. 
ICSID awards were designed to be automatically enforced.  It 
was decided during the ICSID drafting process that states would 
be unable to opt out of recognizing or enforcing awards on the 
ground that they conflicted with public policy because doing so 
would dangerously erode the binding character of the awards.182  
However, doing so indiscriminately does more than impinge 
lightly upon the sovereign status of countries in favor of upholding 
the binding quality of ICSID; it gives a direct blow to the ability of 
sovereign countries to control their economic policy.  Tribunals 
generally view each case on an individual basis; they may not look 
at the full political or economic situation that informed the actions 
a country takes.  If tribunals subsequently rule against countries for 
the politically motivated actions they take, they can paralyze the 
ability of a country that is undergoing massive economic upheaval 
to manage their policies in a way that would provide the largest 
overall utility to investors.  As Rosatti has pointed out, 
 
179 Porzecanski, supra note 174, at 327–28.  A number of Argentina’s assets are 
held out of attachment range in the Bank for International Settlements (BIS). The 
international community has also supported Argentina by granting new loans, via 
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the logical commercial bias present in the international in-
vestment disputes regime . . . raises . . . an additional diffi-
culty to incorporate the ponderation of socio-economic fac-
tors within the decision of a dispute, which would not only 
allow to explain the behavior of the respondent but also to 
find alternative solutions for the claimants.183 
By evaluating each arbitration on the merits, with prior awards 
given little precedential value, ICSID tribunals lack the ability to 
give consideration to the global nature of the problem. 
Within ICSID, the ability of each private investor to bring an 
individual suit against the Argentine debtor in an international fo-
rum that decides each case ad hoc, and rarely relies on precedent 
from one case to another, may have dramatic consequences on the 
future stability of the country’s economy.  Although some compa-
nies that have filed suit under ICSID have agreed to suspend their 
claims as part of interim accords signed with Argentina’s public 
services, they have not been fully dissolved and may be reinstated 
if the accords do not lead to satisfactory results.  Thus, the future 
status of these claims is a key point of contention in the govern-
ment’s revision of 62 utility contracts.184  Although the Attorney of 
the Treasury, Osvaldo Guglielmino, did recognize the tribunal de-
cision in May 2005 against Argentina without resorting to its own 
Courts for counter-judgment, it is unclear what the future outcome 
of continued awards against Argentina will be.185  This is particu-
larly salient because the ICSID Convention does not allow for the 
arbitration process to be suspended until the end of the current ne-
gotiations between the Argentine government and the litigating 
companies.186 
Even if the present situation with Argentina does present major 
problems for operation and enforcement of the ICSID system, it 
does not follow that these issues will incapacitate or delegitimize 
the system as a whole.  For other countries that have suits pending 
against them, the incentives to abide by ICSID judgments, which 
make the system so unique and effective, remain regardless of one 
country’s unique decision not to enforce awards because of the in-
 
183 Rosatti, supra note 146, at 24. 
184 World Bank Claims, supra note 15. 
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ability to pay them.  Developed countries still have an interest in 
seeing that their national investors are able to pull misbehaving 
countries into court.  Developing countries likewise have an incen-
tive to follow through with the obligations imposed by the Con-
vention in order to promote a stable economic environment and 
encourage investment. 
As a result, the major reform necessary as a result of Argen-
tina’s refusal to recognize any judgments may be the modification 
of the ICSID charter in a way which accounts for situations of mas-
sive economic downturns that it had previously overlooked. The 
ICSID arbitration could look to the NPM clauses within BIT 
agreements as a model.  Including such a provision within the 
Convention would still provide investors with protection against 
host States but would also balance the protections against major 
national security concerns.  Because an incentive exists under the 
present system for individual plaintiffs to continue filing suits 
against Argentina in the hopes that they can get money from the 
government before the Treasury is completely depleted, any real 
modification which would take into account States’ overall eco-
nomic status when enforcing is at issue must be accomplished on 
the sovereign state level.  It is in Argentina’s interest, as well as any 
other country that may suffer from an economic failure in the fu-
ture, to be able to create a unified approach to deal with litigation 
stemming from such a collapse. 
But, more than that, the ICSID system must be reformed by in-
cluding essential security interest provisions so that the very rise in 
the number of litigations stemming from this type of economic 
event will not completely incapacitate it.  To some extent, it is com-
forting to know that the bottleneck of Argentina-related cases has 
prompted World Bank officials to rethink the system.  It has been 
reported that the World Bank initiated a process of revision and 
updating of the arbitrage arbitration system.187  Revision of the 
Convention to take into account major economic crises would keep 
the arbitral bureaucracy from becoming overloaded during periods 
of crisis. 
The situation with Argentina has placed the ICSID system in 
uncharted waters, from which it cannot emerge without a substan-
tial alteration in the very way it views itself.  Economic downturns, 
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like that which Argentina underwent in 2001, are not unforeseeable 
in the future.  If ICSID is to survive as a meaningful body, the sig-
natory countries must be able to find a method of dealing with 
countries that do not have the means to enforce judgments against 
them even if they do have the will to do so.  Currently, the fact that 
no such means exists gives Argentina little choice but to continue 
on its current path and possibly violate its international obliga-
tions. 
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